former Evolutionary Economics Group

On the basis of the technical definition of selection developed by George Price (1995), we describe two forms of selection that commonly occur at the social level, subset selection and generative selection. Both forms of selection are abstract and general, and therefore also incomplete; both leave aside the question of explaining the selection criterion and why entities possess stable traits. However, an important difference between the two kinds of selection is that generative selection can accommodate an explanation of how new variation is created, while subset selection cannot. An evolutionary process involving repeated cycles of generative selection can, in principle, continue indefinitely because imperfect replication generates new variation along the way, whereas subset selection reduces variation and eventually grinds to a halt. Even if the two kinds of selection examined here are very different, they share a number of features. First, neither subset selection nor generative selection implies improvement. Neither kind of selection necessarily lead to efficiency or imply systematic outcomes. Second, both subset selection and generative selection can lead to extremely rapid effects in a social population. Third, in the social domain, both generative selection and subset selection involve choice and preference. Neither form of selection necessarily excludes intentionality. In concluding the article, we single out a challenge for future research in identifying the role of various units of culture in selection processes and the multiple levels at which social selection processes take place.

The process of modern growth is different from the kind of growth experienced in Europe and the Orient before 1800 in that it is sustained. Whereas in the premodern past, growth spurts would always run into negative feedback, no such ceiling seems to have been limiting the economic expansion of the past two centuries. The enigma of modern growth has led to a great deal of modeling and speculation amongst economists interested in the topic. One important strand in the literature has been that the Malthusian models that provided much of the negative feedback before 1800, have been short-circuited by the desire and ability of a growing number of individuals to reduce their fertility. Another has been institutional change, which has reduced opportunistic behavior and uncertainty. What has not been stressed enough is that the new technology was made possible by ever increasing "useful knowledge" as Kuznets called it. The sources of this growth in knowledge, surprisingly, have not been fully analyzed. How does "useful knowledge" emerge and develop? Why does it occur in one society and not another, at one time, and why does it take the form it does? This paper examines the details of how new knowledge is created by various combinations of luck, trial and error, inference, and experiment. To analyze the history of useful knowledge, an evolutionary framework to the economic history of useful knowledge is employed.

Growth dynamics and structural change are the two central features of variation / selection processes within populations. This paper explores them in terms of three themes, or sets of accounts, namely Logistic Growth Accounting, Competition Accounting and the Price Theorem. The accounting concepts have in common a concern with 'population thinking' and are essential elements in the study of economic development interpreted as the transformation of initial populations of activities into new kinds of populations. Development can be uncovered at many levels in an economic system, for example in the competitive process at the level of industries, sectors and markets. Business rivalry, underpinned by differential innovative activity, is the basis of the differential survival and growth of competing economic activities and the strategies deployed to create sustainable differences in competitive selection characteristics are at the core of the capitalist dynamic interpreted as an adaptive, evolutionary process. This kind of evolutionary argument is necessarily concerned with growth rate dynamics and the explanation of the diversity of growth rates across entities in a population. The accounting relationships presented are a prelude to deeper causal explanations of evolution in institutions, economies and perhaps in knowledge itself. (PDF)

The last quarter century has seen a renaissance of the proposal that the processes Darwin put forth as driving biological evolution also provide a plausible theoretical framework for analysis of the evolution of human culture. Modern proponents of the idea that human culture evolves through broad Darwinian processes, involving variation and selective retention, of course recognize that the idea is not a new one. There is no doubt, however, that in recent years the idea has become particularly fashionable among scholars. Many advocates of the position use the term "Universal Darwinism", generally believed to have been coined by Richard Dawkins (1983), to denote the theory they are trying to develop. Because it is better known, in what follows I will use that term to denote the broad idea, which I endorse, rather adopting here David Hull's term "General Selection Processes" (1988) to denote the class of dynamic mechanisms one can see operative in particular form in both biological and cultural change. However, I share with Hull the belief that many of the recent attempts to extend Darwinian theory to human culture have stayed too close to biology, and indeed a narrow perspective on biology. In particular, my concern here is that, while a general theory of evolution driven by variation and selective retention would appear highly relevant to analysis of changes over time in many aspects of human culture, some of the specific features that we now know are involved in the evolution of species, particularly entities like genes, and mechanisms like inclusive fitness, may not carry over easily.

It is argued that the 'routines as genes' analogy is misleading in several respects. Neither genes nor routines program behaviour, if this is taken to involve, first, that they determine behaviour and, second, that they do so in a way that excludes conscious, deliberate choice. On a proper understanding of 'gene' and 'routine', knowledge of genes and routines falls far short of predicting behaviour. Furthermore, conscious, deliberate choice is not ruled out when genes or routines are operating. There is a sense in which it can be maintained that genes are (or act as) programs and that individual behaviour is based on them. Such programs might display considerable stability, but their causal impact on behaviour is so remote and indirect that knowing them has little predictive power. It might be possible to identify programs also at levels of organization higher than that of genes that have greater predictive power, but such programs are likely to be unstable over time. On a non-inflationary understanding of 'routines', individual organization members can be viewed as programs on which the smooth functioning of routines is based. This is a far cry from the claim that routines determine firm behaviour, let alone from the claim that they are key success variables in explaining how well (in terms of profitability) firms perform.

The paper examines the innovation dynamics of the mature camera market between 1955 and 1974. This highlights the importance of heterogeneous preferences in determining industry structure. By recognising and accommodating consumer heterogeneity, new firms engaged in radical product and process innovation and overcame the first-mover advantages of dominant firms. The case raises important issues for our understanding of industry life cycles. First, a number of innovation cycles are possible over the life cycle. Second, new rounds of entry, exist and market shake-out can occur, with new, innovative entrants displacing old firms. If the new firms are in developing countries then a shift in global production occurs. Third, a basic tenet of Porterian competitive advantage is overturned because success is based on innovation not wage-cost advantages. Fourth, market structure can change, the industry dividing into a number of market niches that contain distinct user groups. Fifth, incremental modular innovations may be adopted by some user groups but not by others. Consequently, incremental product innovations may be adopted in low-priced goods but not in high-priced goods.

In spite of its checkered intellectual history, and in spite of the myriad proposals of alternative models that claim to account for the broad range of human behavior and to dispense with the need for selection above the organism level, a multilevel selection framework remains the only coherent means of accounting for the persistence and spread of behavioral inclinations which, at least upon first appearance at low frequency, would have been biologically altruistic. This argument is advanced on three tracks: through a review of experimental and observational evidence inconsistent with a narrow version of rational choice theory, through a critique of models or explanations purporting to account for prosocial behavior through other means, and via elaboration of the mechanisms, plausibility, and intellectual history of group selection.

This paper presents an overview on the existing learning models in the economic literature. Furthermore, it discusses which of these models should be used under what circumstances and how adequate learning models can be chosen in simulation approaches. It gives advice for getting along with the many models existing and picking the right one for the own application.

To analyze strategic interaction which may induce externalities, we designed Bathroom Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs. Two people regularly use a bathroom, before leaving they can either clean up the mess made, or not. Cleaning up involves an effort, so this option always gives a lower immediate utility than not cleaning up. The immediate utility of using the bathroom depends on its condition: the cleaner it is, the higher the utility. The pollution at a certain point in time depends on how often the players did not clean up in the past. Furthermore, as the bathroom's condition deteriorates, cleaning up becomes more burdensome, leading to increasing disutilities. We follow the analysis of repeated games and find that if the agents are sufficiently patient, individually-rational rewards can be supported by (subgame perfect) equilibria involving threats. In almost every such equilibrium, the bathroom is cleaned up regularly. (PDF)

Currently there is an ongoing discussion about how Darwinian concepts should be harnessed to further develop economic theory. Two approaches to this question, Universal Darwinism and the continuity hypothesis, are presented in this paper. It is shown whether abstract principles can be derived from Darwin's explanatory model of biological evolution that can be applied to cultural evolution. Furthermore, the relation of the ontological basis of biological and cultural evolution is clarified. Some examples illustrate the respective potential of the two approaches to serve as a starting-point for theory development.

Innovations can be important means to the achievement of improved sustainability. Due to path dependencies, however, the transition from an existing technological trajectory to a more sustainable one is often impeded by significant barriers. These barriers themselves are subject to substantial change over time. Accordingly, periods of stability can be distinguished from periods of instability when a new trajectory can be reached more easily. Sustainable innovations often rely on governmental regulation and the economic burden arising from regulation will be lower in periods of instability. Moreover, innovations are generally associated with fundamental uncertainty such that it becomes impossible to predict the long-run consequences of specific innovations. Under these circumstances, it is essential to facilitate the change between trajectories. The general capability to change from less to more sustainable technological trajectories, or second-order sustainability, is therefore a precondition for achieving (first-order) sustainability. A number of factors (and corresponding indicators) from the techno-economic, political, and socio-cultural sphere are identified that help in judging whether, and possibly when, the incumbent industry is sufficiently destabilized and the political system rendered sufficiently favorable to the new, more sustainable technology to make a transition feasible.

This essay argues that economic systems should be defined in terms of clusters of complementary institutions. To show how such an approach can be carried out, I use a cluster analysis technique and data on forty different economic institutions in OECD nations to isolate four quite different economic systems. After specifying the most important institutional clusters in each system, I then examine what impact these economic systems have on various indicators of economic performance. Finally, I show how such an approach allows particular evolutionary patterns of the systems to be analyzed. (PDF)

While Evolutionary Economics has devoted much attention to the attempt to explain the evolution of institutions that emerge spontaneously, the genesis, diffusion and evaluation of consciously designed institutions has largely been neglected. This paper tries to show (i) how an evolutionary approach to this problem could look like and (ii) in what way Friedrich A. v. Hayek's work can contribute to it. Three aspects are identified as playing a key role in this respect: first, Hayek's positive theory of both the legislative and the judicial law-making process; second, his normative theory, centered on the instrumental value of individual freedom for maintaining the epistemic superiority of spontaneous social orders; and third, his concept of democracy, based on a dynamic deliberation (instead of a static aggregation) view on individual preferences. While there are more or less wide gaps in all three original accounts, there are ways to fill them in an arguably "Hayekian" way and to combine the different threads to a conceptual basis for a Hayekian political economy.

This paper analyzes how the qualitative change in human labor occurs in mutual dependence with the advancement of the epistemic base of technology. Historically, a recurrent pattern can be identified: humans learned to successively transfer labor qualities to machines. The subsequent release of parts of the workforce from performing this labor enabled them to spend this spare time in the search for further technical innovations, i.e., the generation and application of ever-more knowledge. A model examines the autocatalytic relationship between the production of commodities and knowledge. The driving forces of these processes and the mechanisms that limit them are analyzed. (PDF)

This paper discusses how the results of simulation models can be made more reliable and the method of simulating therefore more widely applicable. We suggested to calibrate simulation models empirically and developed a methodology based on Critical Realism in order to so. We suggested combining the procedures of two strands of literature: the empirical underpinning of the assumptions (like in microsimulations) and the empirical check of the implications (like in Bayesian inference). Both these strands of literature are mainly concerned with predicting future developments. We, instead, aim to infer statements about causal relations and characteristics of a set of systems or dynamics, such as, e.g., the development of an industry, that have a general validity for this set of systems or dynamics. In other words, instead of deriving probabilistic predictions of the future and statements of the current situation and dynamics of one single system we developed a methodology to gain general statements about the features of systems and dynamics. (PDF)

Network theory is rapidly changing our understanding of complex systems, but the relevance of topological features for the dynamic behavior of metabolic networks, food webs, production systems,information networks, or cascade failures of power grids remains to be explored. Based on a simple model of supply networks, we offer an interpretation of instabilities and oscillations observed in biological, ecological, economic, and engineering systems. We find that most supply networks display damped oscillations, even when their units - and linear chains of these units - behave in a non-oscillatory way. Moreover, networks of damped oscillators tend to produce growing oscillations. This surprising behavior offers, for example, a new interpretation of business cycles and of oscillating or pulsating processes.The network structure of material flows itself turns out to be a source of instability, and cyclical variations are an inherent feature of decentralized adjustments.

Schumpeterian development is characterised by the simultaneous interplay of growth and qualitative transformations of the economic system. At the sectoral level, such qualitative transformations become manifest as variations in the sectoral composition of production. Following the implementation of Harberger's method of visualising the impact of differential productivity growth, dynamic panel estimations are applied to a standard growth model modified to include specific structural variables for both the manufacturing and the services sectors. Covering 28 countries over the period between 1990 and 2000, the results give empirical substance to the evolutionary emphasis on Schumpeterian development as opposed to mere aggregate growth.

During its early and formative years, the U.S. tire industry was heavily concentrated around Akron, Ohio. We test the extent to which entrants in Ohio were attracted to the Akron area by agglomeration benefits, contributing to a self-reinforcing process envisioned in many modern theories of geography. We trace the geographic and intellectual heritage of the Ohio entrants and analyze the factors underlying their creation and location at the county level. Our findings suggest it was the creation of entrants, largely spurred by the supply of entrepreneurs, and not the attraction of entrants to the Akron area that fueled the agglomeration of the industry there. (PDF)

Novelty and heterogeneity are two closely related issues. Heterogeneity is not only a result of the emergence of novelty which creates variety in any evolving system. Heterogeneous elements are also required as inputs for the recombination processes underlying the generation of novelty. However, while heterogeneity figures prominently in computational and agent-based economics and in complex adaptive systems analysis, novelty and its emergence are neglected topics. In order to make progress with the latter the paper starts with a discussion of how novelty is being generated both in the case of genetic novelty and that of mental novelty. For the case of mental novelty it is then shown that the bottleneck in our understanding of novelty is not the generation procedure proper, but rather the procedure by which our mind evaluates or interprets the outcome. On the basis of this distinction it is briefly sketched how, for different forms of novelty, the degree of novelty may be rank-ordered and how the limits to predictability in the context of novelty vary with that degree.

The paper investigates the interplay between the institutions of law and property and innate propensities towards possession. The questions to be answered are: How do property relations emerge in historical-anthropological terms in contrast to the well-known constitutional perspective and what role do preferences - as human cognitive and behavioural dispositions - play in this process? The paper conjectures that possessiveness towards specific objects together with a primary attitude toward first rules of law, that is some rule preference and commitment, shape patterns and outcomes of property relations. More complex structures of property relations have developed together with technological advances. The differences in property relations across different societies result partly from diverse ecological conditions and partly from culturally transmitted traditions.

Drawing on extensive research related to successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern common-pool resources, I wish to address what I consider to be the next important step in our theoretical understanding of complex settings. I address how we can identify the working parts of rules. It is difficult to study the evolution of institutions without a clear language for describing and analyzing the underlying working parts creating markets, governments at all levels, private property, and structures inside individual firms. Thus, this paper identifies the rules underlying institutional games so that we can study their evolution.

The purpose of this paper is to take a closer look at the relation between human intentionality and design on the one side and the "blind" forces of evolution on the other. Specifically, I discuss two issues that Ulrich Witt has raised in recent publications, namely, first, the issue of whether the role that human intelligence and intentionality play in man-made or cultural evolution requires us to adopt a non-Darwinian concept of evolution, and, second, the issue of what the fact that cultural evolution is man-made implies for our capacity to "control" the evolutionary process and for our "responsibility" with regard to its overall outcomes.

Human behavior is influenced both by internal norms or values ("what people think to be just behavior") and exogenous restrictions including legal sanctions. In the paper we study the interaction between these legal and extralegal forces and highlight the possibility of a countervailing effect of norms and individual in the face of changes in the legal environment. Building on the stylized fact that people's individual values are partly static and partly subject to change overtime, we consider these social and legal forces as two main factors that contribute to the change in individual values. Legal innovation that departs from current values may lead to private enforcement norms or civil disobedience. Through private enforcement of expressive laws and through civil disobedience, individuals reveal their approbation or disapproval of laws to other individuals. This may lead to a hysteresis effect on individual values that may have a reinforcing or countervailing effect on the legal innovation. Our model of countervailing norms complements the existing literature on expressive law by showing conditions under which the equilibrium behavior may move in the opposite direction from that intended by the law. Our model studies the dynamics of such problem and unveils several important predictions and practical implications for the design of law.

This paper delivers some findings from the present-day cognitive sciences on man's cognitive dispositions that support aspects of Veblen's "nstinct of workmanship," which is an essential starting point of his evolutionary theory of institutional change. These cognitive dispositions partly govern which information will be subject to profound contemplation and be easy to disseminate within a population. Furthermore, they may give rise to a bias in human creativity. As a result, some cognitive foundations of the "nstinct of workmanship" may induce a general direction in long-term economic development by influencing the continuous accretion of knowledge during cultural evolution.