former Evolutionary Economics Group

In the last two decades there has been a noticeable increase in published research in evolutionary economics. The idea that formal modelling is a sine qua non condition for establishing a rigours and coherence scientific frame, has led to an over concern with formalization issues among evolutionary researchers. The general perception is that formalization lags behind the appreciative work. Notwithstanding, this general reading has not yet been supported by real data analysis. This work presents a comprehensive survey on evolutionary economics, intending at exploring the main research paths and contributions of this theorizing framework using bibliometric methods. This documentation effort is based on an extensive review of the abstracts from articles published in all economic journals gathered from the Econlit database over the past fifty years. Evolutionary contributions apparently have not converged to an integrated approach. In the present paper, we document the more important paths emergent in this field. Before 1990, the importance of published evolutionary related research is almost negligible - more than 90% of total papers were published after that date. Our results further show two rather extreme main research strands: 'History of Economic Thought and Methodology' and 'Games'. Moreover, formal approaches have a reasonable and increasing share of published papers between 1969 and 2005. In contrast, purely empirical-related works are relatively scarce, involving a meagre and stagnant percentage of published works. This recalls for a need to redirect the evolutionary research agenda.

The paper makes the case for an empirically grounded, "bottom-up" approach to theory building in evolutionary industrial economics. This approach is based on studying systematically selected industries that are comparable in key dimensions. It opens up opportunities for testing the relevance, preconditions, and generality of explanatory factors in industry evolution. An illustration of the approach is subsequently given by presenting some findings on the evolution of the historical U.S. farm tractor industry.

Advocates of natural selection usually regard rationality as redundant, i.e., as a mere linguistic device to describe natural selection. But this "Redundancy Thesis" faces the anomaly that rationality differs from natural selection. One solution is to conceive rationality as a trait selected by the neo-Darwinian mechanism of natural selection as . But this "Rationality-qua-Trait Thesis" faces a problem as well: Following neo-Darwinism, one cannot classify one allele of, e.g., eyesight as better than another without reference to constraints while one can classify rationality as better than irrationality irrespective of constraints. Therefore, natural selection cannot be a trait. This leads us to the only solution: Rationality is actually a method that cannot be reduced to a trait. This "Rationality-qua-Method Thesis" lays the ground for alternative, developmental views of evolution. (PDF)

This article studies entrepreneurial activities emerging out of one of Germany's most prominent dot.com firms: Intershop, a maker of e-commerce software. We show that Intershop spawned at least 30 spin-offs. The majority entered locally, giving rise to a small but growing software cluster and counteracting the job losses accompanying the parent firm's drastic downsizing after 2000. We trace the knowledge transfer from Intershop to the spin-offs and relate it to recent theorizing on the spin-off process as well as spin-off-based cluster formation. The Intershop case suggests that temporarily successful dot.coms could exert lasting effects on regional development.

published as: 'B2C - bubble to cluster: the dot-com boom, spin-off entrepreneurship, and regional agglomeration', in: Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 19 (3), 2009, 349-378.

The long-standing critique of the 'economic model of man' has gained new impetus not least due to the broadening research in behavioral and experimental economics. Many of the critics have focused on the apparent difficulty of traditional rational choice theory to account for the role of moral or ethical concerns in human conduct, and a number of authors have suggested modifications in the standard model in response to such critique. This paper takes issue with a quite commonly adopted 'revisionist' strategy, namely seeking to account for moral concerns by including them as additional preferences in an agent's utility function. It is argued that this strategy ignores the critical difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over actions, and that it fails to recognize that 'moral preferences' belong into the second category. Preferences over actions, however, cannot be consistently accounted for within a theoretical framework that focuses on the rationality of single actions. They require a shift of perspective, from a theory of rational choice to a theory of rule-following behavior.

In this paper we present a history-friendly model of the changing vertical scope of computer firms during the evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries. The model is "history friendly", in that it attempts at replicating some basic, stylized qualitative features of the evolution of vertical integration on the basis of the causal mechanisms and processes which we believe can explain the history. The specific question addressed in the model is set in the context of dynamic and uncertain technological and market environments, characterized by periods of technological revolutions punctuating periods of relative technological stability and smooth technical progress. The model illustrates how the patterns of vertical integration and specialization in the computer industry change as a function of the evolving levels and distribution of firms' capabilities over time and how they depend on the co-evolution of the upstream and downstream sectors. Specific conditions in each of these markets - the size of the external market, the magnitude of the technological discontinuities, the lock-in effects in demand - exert critical effects and feedbacks on market structure and on the vertical scope of firms as time goes by.

Based on new data, this paper studies invention disclosure, licensing, and firm formation activities of Max Planck Institute directors over the time period 1985-2004, and analyzes their effects on scientists' publication and citation records. The results are consistent with prior findings that inventing does not adversely affect research output. More mixed results are obtained with regard to academic entrepreneurship. The analysis raises questions vis-�is earlier explanations for positive relationships between inventing and publishing. It finds little evidence than inventors learn from interacting with firms. Likewise, license revenues do not enable scientists to step up their research activities.

This paper relates firm size and opportunism by showing that, given certain behavioral dispositions of humans, the size of a profit-maximizing firm can be determined by cognitive aspects underlying firm-internal cultural transmission processes. We argue that what firms do better than markets - besides economizing on transaction costs - is to establish a cooperative regime among its employees that keeps in check opportunism. A model depicts the outstanding role of the entrepreneur or business leader in firm-internal socialization processes and the evolution of corporate cultures. We show that high opportunism-related costs are a reason for keeping firms' size small.

The evolutionary explanation of human dispositions to prosocial behaviour and to moralization of such behaviour undermines the moral realist's belief in objective moral facts that hold independently of people's contingent desires. At the same time, advocacy of preferences for significant departures from hallowed policies (that is, for 'loud policies') is generally sure to be ineffective unless it is moralized. It may seem that this requires the economist who would advocate loud policies, but is also committed to a naturalistic account of human social and cognitive behaviour, to engage in wilful manipulation, morally hectoring people even when she knows that her doing so ought rationally to carry no persuasive force. Furthermore, it might be wondered on what basis just for herself an error theorist about morality advocates loud policies. I argue that understanding the role of moralized preferences in the maintenance of the self, and in turn understanding the economic rationale of such self-maintenance, allows us to see how and why preferences can be moralized by a believer in error theory without this implying hypocrisy or manipulation of others. (PDF)

The fundamental, underlying assumption in economics, public choice, and increasingly in political science and other branches of the social sciences is that individuals are rational actors. Many people have questioned the realism of this assumption, however, and considerable experimental evidence seems to refute it. This paper builds on recent findings from the field of evolutionary psychology to discuss the evolution of rational behavior in humans. It then goes on to relate this evolutionary process to the evolution of political institutions and in particular of democratic institutions. (PDF)

This paper gives a brief overview of an evolutionary theory of fairness. The ideas are fleshed out in Binmore's book 'Natural Justice' (Oxford University Press, New York, 2005.), which is itself a condensed version of his earlier two-volume book 'Game Theory and the Social Contract' (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994 and 1998). (PDF)

Innovations are inherently connected to knowledge transfers. The need of face-to-face contacts to transfer tacit knowledge is commonly argued to cause a regional dimension of innovative activities. The paper presents an alternative explanation based on a model of boundedly rational actors who search for knowledge. It is shown that a regional dimension exists in these processes that results from a regional bias in an actor's search activities. Social embeddedness, a shared regional identity and limited spatial mobility foster this bias. We argue that insights from research on these topics can help to define the geographic size of a region.

Evolutionary economics is a paradigm for explaining the transformation of the economy. To achieve its goal, it needs being founded on a proper theory of economic behavior. The paper discusses these foundations. It is argued that the historical malleability of economic behavior is based on the interactions between innate behavior dispositions and adaptation mechanisms on the one hand and the limited, and always selective, cognitive and observational learning that contributes to an ever more extended and differentiated action knowledge. The implications of this interpretation are outlined in an exemplary fashion for the case of the evolution and growth of consumption.

The Lisbon strategy for growth and jobs seeks to use knowledge and innovation in the context of the European Research Area (ERA). To build the ERA the European Union (EU) implements – amongst others - regional innovation policy. Ample scientific publications have investigated how innovation drives regional dynamics. Therefore, we assess the goals of European regional innovation policy in the light of the scientific findings, which we collected and condensed by bibliometrical analysis. The general goals of the Lisbon strategy to at the same time stimulate growth and achieve cohesion of economic activities across the EU is not in line with the finding that positive cumulative and self-reinforcing processes go hand in hand with the agglomeration of economic activities. However, the goals of the specific innovation policies for the regional level are mainly in line with the scientific findings. (PDF)

The paper unravels the subversive nature of Schumpeter's proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, 'creative destruction' leads to economic development 'from within' (macro). It is argued that Schumpeter paved the way for a new micro–meso–macro framework in economics. Centre stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualised by many agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a 'deep' invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualisation process unfolds over time – modelled in the paper as a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention – and here meso represents a process component of a visible 'surface' structure. The universal macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence. At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and at the surface level as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one. The final third of the paper discusses a few of the rich set of major contributions to the Neo-Schumpeterian – micro-meso-macro - programme

In "monopoly epistemics", one privileged actor is asked to identify the truth. In "democratic epistemics," several independent parties are asked. In an experiment contrasting them, democratic epistemics reduced the systemic error rate by two-thirds, supporting the claim that replacing monopoly epistemics with democratic epistemics would reduce error rates in forensic science and other areas. It also suggests first, the potential of "epistemic systems design," which employs the techniques of economic systems design to address issues of veracity, rather than efficiency, and second, the value of "experimental epistemology," which employs experimental techniques in the study of science. Research of the sort described here puts evolutionary epistemology into practice by seeking to find the proper design principles for error-correcting social institutions. (PDF)

In recent economic literature, there has been an increasing interest in modelling preferences as endogenous. Some arguments go along the lines that institutions shape preferences. This paper suggests that adopting a more substantive concept of preferences furthers our understanding of how they systematically shape institutions. We integrate social-psychological concepts and combine them with an account of learning. Thus, a model of the dynamic interrelation between preferences and institutions can be developed. While institutional change can certainly be partly explained in terms of changing incentives, we offer an approach that goes beyond the standard explanation.

Local industrial clusters have attracted much attention in recent economic
and geographic literature. The focus has been on identifying the conditions for the emergence of such clusters. Here the long-term implications of local industrial clusters are studied. To this end, we examine German regions where those that contain long-existing industrial clusters are compared to all other regions. We statistically examine what characterises regions that have contained local industrial clusters for quite some time. The analysis is conducted separately for three industries.

One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur – given these predispositions – can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees' behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.

This article reviews the way of thinking about economic problems and the research agenda associated with the evolutionary approach to economics. This approach generally focuses on the processes that transform the economy from within and on their consequences for firms and industries, production, trade, employment and growth. The article highlights the major contributions to evolutionary economics and explains its key concepts together with some of their implications.

published in: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. Palgrave Macmillan. 20 May 2008. <http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000295> doi:10.1057/9780230226203.0511

Boundedly rational consumers rely on their social environment as a source of information. Drawing upon psychological theories about social comparison processes, we hypothesize that social reference groups underlie market segments. New reference groups can emerge from social comparison processes, leading to the establishment of new submarkets and the evolution of aggregate consumer heterogeneity. These propositions are tested with series of cross-sectional surveys on footwear consumption of German men between 1980 and 1991. Using latent class models, we describe the emergence of the submarket for athletic shoes as a function of the appearance and establishment of a new social consumer group.

Market growth is driven by product innovation. Beyond functional satiation the marginal utility of product performance and variety decreases. We argue that social comparisons underlying innovation diffusion results in consumer motivations for upward assimilation toward the behavior of better performing others, even beyond functional requirements. We distinguish consumption growth patterns driven by functional vs. assimilating motivations. These patterns are tested by time-series analyses of U.S. Footwear consumption between 1955 and 2002. The acceleration of market growth since the 1970s is statistically explained by changes in price, cross-price elasticity, and the increasing demand for innovations, according to our theoretical account of consumption motivations beyond functional satiation. (PDF)

This paper introduces a categorization of simulation models. It provides an explicit overview of the steps that lead to a simulation model. We highlight the advantages and disadvantages of various simulation approaches by examining how they advocate different ways of constructing simulation models. To this end, it discusses a number of relevant methodological issues, such as how realistic simulation models are obtained and which kinds of inference can be used in a simulation approach. Finally, the paper presents a practical guide on how simulation should and can be conducted.

Considerable debate surrounds the concept of entrepreneurial opportunities. This paper contributes to the discussion by bringing in concepts and findings from evolutionary economics. It makes three points. First, adopting an evolutionary market process perspective sheds new light on the nature of opportunities. Second, not only the pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities, but also the further development of the entrepreneurial venture is dependent on subjective opportunity perception and interpretation. Third, findings on industry evolution help understand how opportunities, as well as agents' ability and willingness to pursue them, change over time. Effects of pre-entry experience on opportunity recognition and firm performance are also discussed.